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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction was originally vested in the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to §78-2-2 (3) (j), U.C.A.

(1953 as amended); however,

pursuant to the authority vested in the Utah Supreme Court this
case was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition
on June 10, 1993.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Did the court err in rendering summary judgment
for the plaintiff while failing to consider equities favoring the
defendant inasmuch as the evidence, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the defendant, does not support a finding that there
are no genuine issues of material fact?
Standard of Review:

Summary judgment requires that the

evidence be viewed and all inferences be drawn in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party.
Insurance Co. 819 P.2d 803
Carbon County, 805 P.2d

Billings v. Union Banker's

(Utah 1991);

789

Ehlers Architects v.

(Utah App. 1991) .

Treloggon v.

Treloggon, 699 P.2d 474 (Utah 1985).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter arises out of a lawsuit filed by the plaintiff,
Clays S. Cutler through his guardian ad litem Mary Ellen Cutler,
seeking the return of certain life insurance proceeds which were
paid to the defendant, Linda Cutler, upon the death of defendant's
husband, and Mary Ellen Cutler's ex-husband, Marlon S.
On January

5, 1993, the district

court

Cutler.

entered

summary

judgment in favor of the plaintiff ordering the return of life
insurance proceeds previously paid to the defendant, and ordering

1

the defendant's home held in constructive trust to secure payment
of the judgment.

R.134.

On January 8, 1993, the defendant filed

a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and an Objection to Findings of
Fact pursuant to Rules 52(b) and 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. R.144. The district court denied defendant's Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment on March 24, 1993, but, ordered that
paragraphs 8, 11, and 12 of the court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law be amended to conform with the court's ruling of
February 18, 1993. R.169.

Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on

April 6, 1993, appealing the court's final Judgment entered January
5, 1993, and subsequent Order Denying Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgement dated March 24, 1993. R.172.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Marlon S. Cutler and Mary Ellen Cutler were divorced pursuant
to the Box Elder County District Court's Decree of Divorce entered
August 24, 1989.

R. 125.

At the time of the divorce Mary Ellen

Cutler and Marlon S. Cutler had a 13 year old child, Clay S.
Cutler, born March 25, 1976.

Pursuant to the parties stipulation

and decree of divorce Marlon S. Cutler was ordered to pay Mary
Ellen Cutler child support
commencing September 1, 1989.

in the sum of $150.00 per month
(Addendum A, p. 2, 3).

Approximately one week prior to the entry of the Decree of
Divorce,

Mary

stipulation

Ellen

Cutler

and property

and

Marlon

settlement

S.

Cutler

agreement

entered

containing

a

the

following provision relating to certain life insurance proceeds:
Paragraph 3(c)-Plaintiff and defendant agree that each
will continue in force and effect any life insurance
policies that each party currently has for the benefit of
the minor child of the parties. R.125.

2

This life insurance language was also included in the findings of
fact but was omitted from the Cutler decree of divorce.

R.116,

128. At the time of the divorce, Marlon Cutler had two policies of
life insurance, one with Gem Insurance Company in the amount of
$43,000.00, and the second with the Provident Life and Accident
Company in the amount of $13,758.62.
the Gem

Insurance

At the time of the divorce

Company policy named

the decedent's adult

daughter, Mardi Ann Cutler, as the primary beneficiary and his
minor son, Clay S. Cutler, as a secondary beneficiary. The primary
beneficiary of the Provident Life and Accident Insurance Policy at
the time of the divorce was the decedent's mother, Beth Cutler, and
his minor son, Clay S. Cutler, was a secondary or alternate
beneficiary.
On

R.166.

November

22,

1989,

the

decedent

changed

the

named

beneficiary on the Provident Life and Accident insurance policy
from the decedent's mother to his adult daughter, Mardi Ann Cutler,
and his minor son, Clay S. Cutler, as co-beneficiaries.
167.

R. 166-

In July of 1990, the decedent changed the Provident Life and

Accident insurance naming his second wife, defendant Linda Cutler,
as primary beneficiary and his minor son, Clay Cutler, as secondary
beneficiary.

In July of 1990, the decedent changed the beneficiary

on the Gem State insurance policy to his second wife, defendant
Linda Cutler, as primary beneficiary while his minor son, Clay S.
Cutler, remained as secondary beneficiary.

R.167.

The district court in entering its summary judgment in favor
of plaintiff found specifically based on the Affidavit of Mary
Ellen Cutler's former attorney, Thomas L. Willmore, that the
decedent Marlon S. Cutler read, discussed, and understood the
3

contents and terms of divorce stipulation and findings of fact and
was therefore bound by the terms and provisions of the stipulation
although the provisions were omitted from the decree of divorce.
R.128.

The district court also found that whether the defendant

was aware or unaware of the language of the stipulation and
findings of fact was of no consequence and that her right's could
not be enlarged by the fact of her marriage. R.128. Furthermore,
the court found that the insurance policies were not part of the
estate of decedent Marlon S. Cutler, that whether or not the
plaintiff, Clay S. Cutler, received Social Security benefits had no
relevance, and that there was no indication that the insurance was
to provide for the minor child only in lieu of child support.
R.120, 130.
The court entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff
ordering that the insurance proceeds be immediately delivered to
the plaintiff and applied to the total judgment. The court ordered
that the defendant's real property be held in constructive trust to
remain free and clear of any liens and encumbrances pending payment
of the insurance proceeds to the plaintiff. In addition, the court
ordered that interest be paid on the insurance proceeds at the rate
of ten percent

(10%) per annum from and after the defendant

received the insurance proceeds until the date of judgment and
thereafter at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum.

R. 134-

137.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in rendering summary judgment in favor
of the plaintiff while failing co consider equities favoring the
defendant inasmuch as the evidence was insufficient to support a
4

finding that there are no genuine issues of material fact.

Since

the language of the divorce stipulation and property settlement
agreement is unclear the trial court must examine the underlying
intent of the parties relative to the disposition of insurance
proceeds.

The stipulation did not identify a specific policy of

insurance nor did it declare an amount of coverage expected to be
maintained for the benefit of the minor child. At the time of the
divorce

the minor

child was only an alternate

or

secondary

beneficiary of each policy. Since the decedent acted to change the
name of the primary beneficiary, the trial court's conclusion that
the decedent fully understood the terms and provisions of the
stipulation cannot be supported when viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the defendant.
The evidence and affidavits presented to the trial court fail
to prove the decedent's intent regarding the disposition of life
insurance proceeds.

The affidavits contain hearsay and opinion

evidence which is inadmissible and legally insufficient to justify
the

court's

ruling

since

neither

affidavit

clarifies

the

ambiguities contained in the stipulation nor resolves factual
issues raised by the decedent's actions in changing the named
beneficiaries on the insurance policies.
Given

the

ambiguity

of

paragraph

3(c)

of

the

divorce

stipulation, and given the decedent's actions in changing the named
beneficiaries, it is clear that the decedent intended to provide
for his second wife in the event of his death.

The cumulative

effect of the language contained in the child support and insurance
paragraphs of the divorce stipulation coupled with the fact that
the decedent changed the name of the primary beneficiary of each
5

insurance policy to the defendant leads to the conclusion that the
decedent and his former wife had different understandings as to the
effect of paragraph 3(c) of the stipulation. Given the evidence of
the decedent's intent to provide for the defendant in the event of
his death, the trial court erred in failing to consider equitable
evidence and arguments which may favor an award of all or part of
the proceeds to the defendant.

Furthermore, since the trial

court's ruling results in manifest injustice to the defendant, the
Utah Court of Appeals may fashion a remedy of its own in accordance
with the demands of justice.

The defendant contends that the

judgment should be reversed and the proceeds of the life insurance
policies awarded to the defendant or at a minimum the case remanded
to the trial court for further hearing with instructions to divide
the insurance proceeds equitably.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RENDERING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THERE ARE NO GENUINE
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT.

Since summary judgment denies a party a trial on the merits,
the appellate court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable
to the non-moving party and should affirm a summary judgment only
where it appears that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material facts, or even in light of the facts as contended by the
loosing party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.

Themv v. Seagull Enters, Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979) .

Briaas v. Hoi comb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987) .
Engineering, Inc., 808 P.2d 1137 (Utah App. 1991).

Hunt v. ESI
Furthermore,

since an appeal of the summary judgment presents for review only

6

the trial court's conclusions of law because by definition summary
judgments
reviews
deference

do

not

those

resolve

conclusions

to the trial

factual
for

court's

issues, the

correctness
legal

appellate

without

conclusions.

court

according
Bonham v.

Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989) . TransAmerica Cash Reserve, Inc.
v. Dixie Power and Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990) . Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d
184 (Utah 1991).
A.

THE AFFIDAVITS AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT

LEAVE SEVERAL ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT UNRESOLVED.
The proper approach in determining the disposition of the
proceeds of the decedent's life insurance policies requires that
the court view the property settlement agreement and the decree
confirming it, as the court would a contract.

See Lock v. Lock, 8

Ariz. App. 138, 444 P. 2d 163 (1968) . Using this approach the court
should first look to the language of the contract or stipulation.
If the language is clear the court need go no further.

If however,

the language is unclear the court must examine whatever evidence
available to determine the parties' intent.

Crozier v. Equitable

Life Assurance Society, 658 P.2d 39 (Wash. App. 1983);

See

also,

White v. Michigan Life Ins. Co., 43 Mich. App. 653, 204 N.W. 2d,
772 (1972) .
In the case at hand the language of paragraph 3(c) of the
stipulation and property settlement agreement is less than clear
since it did not specifically name an insurance policy or an amount
of the coverage expected to be maintained.
parties'

minor

son

was

only

an

Furthermore, since the

alternate

beneficiary

of

the

policies at the time of the divorce and since the decedent changed
7

the names of the primary beneficiaries on each policy it is
arguable that the decedent maintained no insurance for the benefit
of the minor child at the time of the divorce and intended only
that the primary beneficiaries use the policy proceeds for his
son's support in the event of death.
In paragraph 8 of the district court's Amended Findings of
Fact, the court states:
The affidavits of Mr. Thomas L. Willmore and Mary Ellen
Cutler with accompanying attachments indicate that the
deceased read and discussed the contents, terms, and
provisions of not only the stipulation but likewise the
findings. As to that aspect the court finds that the
deceased was bound by the terms and provisions of the
stipulation which he obviously read and signed and by the
findings just as if the provisions were found in the
decree.
The

court's

findings

contained

in

paragraph

8

are

wholly

unsupported by the affidavits of Thomas Willmore and Mary Ellen
Cutler which clearly do not state that Mr. Cutler read or discussed
the contents, terms, and provisions of the stipulation and findings
entered in the divorce action.

These affidavits fail to provide

any competent evidence as to Mr. Cutler's understanding and intent
as it related to paragraph 3(c) of the stipulation and paragraph
6(c)(3) of the findings of fact.

Furthermore, there is no

evidence in the affidavits sufficient to support a finding or
conclusion that the deceased understood the stipulation regarding
life insurance. To the contrary, the Willmore affidavit indicates
that the deceased appeared in Mr. Willmore's office and signed the
stipulation in front of his secretary only.

(Addendum F, p. 2).

Contrary to the trial court's Memorandum Decision, the fact
that the decree of divorce did not contain the language found in
the

stipulation

and

findings relative to the maintenance of
8

insurance for the parties' minor child is significant in that the
decedent's

actions

in

changing

the

policy

beneficiaries

demonstrates that the parties' intent regarding disposition of the
life insurance was unclear. The decedent's actions in changing the
named

primary

beneficiaries

of

the policies

as

outlined

in

paragraph 11 and 12 of the court's Amended Findings of Fact
indicate

that

Marlon

S.

Cutler's

understanding

different than that of Mary Ellen Cutler.

was

clearly

In addition, the

decedent's actions seem contrary to the court's conclusions in
paragraph 15 of the Findings of Fact that the parties knew or
understood the policies of insurance they had and intended to
continue in the future for the benefit of the minor child.
At the time of the divorce the decedent's adult daughter,
Mardi Ann Cutler, was the primary beneficiary of the $43,000.00 Gem
Insurance Company policy and the decedent's minor son, Clay S.
Cutler, was only a secondary beneficiary.
Beth

Cutler,

was

the primary

The decedent's mother,

beneficiary

of

the

$13,758.62

Provident Life and Accident insurance policy, and his minor son,
Clay S. Cutler, was a secondary or alternate beneficiary.

R.166-

167. Three months after the divorce in November 1989, the decedent
changed the named beneficiary on the Provident Life and Accident
policy from his mother to his adult daughter while maintaining his
minor son as a co-beneficiary. This action alone casts grave doubt
on the trial court's conclusions that the decedent and his former
wife knew and understood which policies of insurance were intended
to continue in the future for the benefit of the minor child.
Furthermore, exactly what each party understood "for the benefit"
to mean is also unclear.
9

In July of 1990 the decedent further changed the primary
beneficiary of the Provident policy to his second wife, Linda
Cutler while his minor son Clay Cutler remained a secondary
beneficiary.

In July of 1990, the decedent also changed the name

of the primary beneficiary of the Gem Insurance Company policy to
his second wife, Linda Cutler, while his minor son, Clay Cutler,
remained as secondard beneficiary. Clearly the decedent's changing
of the named beneficiaries when viewed in the light most favorable
to the defendant cannot lead to the conclusion that the decedent
fully understood the terms and provisions of the stipulation and
findings in the divorce when in fact the terms are ambiguous.

An

equally likely conclusion is that the decedent intended only that
sufficient policy proceeds be used to provide for his son's support
during his minority and that the decedent's second wife be the
beneficiary of the remaining proceeds. Alternatively the decedent
may have intended only that the Provident policy be maintained for
his minor son while the Gen Policy be maintained for his second
wife.
B. THE AFFIDAVITS OF MARY ELLEN CUTLER AND THOMAS L. WILLMORE
ARE LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT FAILING TO PROVE DECEDENT'S INTENT.
The affidavit of Mary Ellen Cutler is inconclusive as to the
deceased's intent regarding disposition of all life insurance
proceeds and is largely based on hearsay and opinion evidence which
is inadmissible.

Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

states:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively
that the affiant is competent to testify....

10

Contrary to Rule 56(e), neither the Willmore affidavit nor the Mary
Ellen Cutler affidavit provide a factual basis for the court's
findings based on personal knowledge.
hearsay

and

opinion

testimony

The affidavits

reflecting

contain

unsubstantiated

conclusions and fail to state sufficient evidentiary facts to allow
the court to determine as a matter of law that there are no genuine
issues of material fact remaining to be decided.

See Walker v.

Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1973) ; Williams
v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985);

Norton v. Blackum, 669 P.2d

859 (Utah 1983).
Specifically the affidavit of Thomas L. Willmore states that
all information he received for the divorce action came from Mrs.
Cutler, that he did not receive any information from Mr. Cutler nor
did he have any discussions or negotiations with Mr. Cutler or
anyone representing him.
Mr.

Cutler

appeared

R.109. The affidavit further states that

in Mr. Willmore's

office

and

signed

stipulation only in front of his secretary, Marie Riggs.
The affidavit of Mary Ellen Cutler contains hearsay

the

R.110.

statements

relating to her discussions with her former husband which are
inadmissible

as

to

the

ultimate

issue

before

the

court

and

insufficient to justify the court's ruling since the statements do
not

clarify

the ambiguity

of

the stipulation

nor

resolve

the

factual questions raise by the decedent's actions changing the
named

beneficiaries

on

the

policies.

R.98-100.

Addendums F, p. 1, 2; and G, p. 1, 2, 3) .

(See also,

While the affidavits

provide the court with a general understanding of how the divorce
was procedurally undertaken, they do not provide the court with
sufficient

evidence

to

support
11

the

trial

court's

conclusions

regarding the decedent's intent and understanding of paragraph 3(c)
of the stipulation.
ARGUMENT
II.

DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AWARDED THE PROCEEDS OF
THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES SINCE THE
DECEDENT'S DESIGNATION OF THE DEFENDANT AS
BENEFICIARY UNDER THE POLICIES IS A CLEAR
INDICATION OF THE DECEDENT'S INTENT TO VEST A
PROPERTY RIGHT IN THE DEFENDANT.

In Culbertson v. Continental Assurance Co., 631 P.2d 906 (Utah
1981) the Supreme Court of Utah set forth the rule regarding the
disposition of insurance proceeds which have been the subject of
property settlement agreements between spouses.

The general rule

provides:
General expressions or clauses in [property settlement
agreements] are not to be construed as including an
assignment or renunciation of expectancies; Therefore,
a beneficiary retains his status under an insurance
policy or will if it does not clearly appear from the
agreement that in addition to the segregation of the
property of the spouses it was intended to deprive either
spouse of the right to take property under the will or
insurance contract of the other.
In Culbertson, the decedent's second wife brought an action to
have proceeds of a profit sharing plan and certain insurance
policies awarded to the decedent's estate rather than to the
decedent's first wife as his designated beneficiary.

The Supreme

Court ruled that the decedent's first wife was entitled to the
proceeds of the profit sharing plan and insurance since the
decedent neither changed the designated beneficiaries nor sought an
explicit relinquishment of his first wife's expectancy interest.
Furthermore, the court ruled that where there were no broad
comprehensive provisions in the decree which could reasonably be
construed as a relinquishment or waiver of the first wife's

12

expectancies, and where the decree did not expressly terminate her
status as beneficiary she was entitled to the proceeds.

Id. at

913, 914.
The Culbertson court categorized the types of cases which
commonly give rise to claims made by former spouses on insurance
policies in which the former spouse is a designated beneficiary.
The first involves a property settlement agreement or decree of
divorce in which a spouse relinquishes any claim to ownership of
the policies and agrees to execute any documents to sever such
interest.

The rule in such cases is that unless the decree or

property settlement agreement explicitly waives the expectancy
interest, the former spouse is entitled to receive the proceeds as
a designated beneficiary since the courts emphasize the decedent's
right to change the beneficiary if he so desires. The second group
of cases involves insurance policies not specifically mentioned in
the property settlement agreement or decree of divorce where there
are provisions effecting a complete settlement of the parties'
property interests and awarding each all right, title, and interest
in his or her respective property. The rule in these cases is that
an agreement with such general provisions is deemed merely to
effect a division of the parties' property and the court cannot
reasonably infer from such language that the spouse has released an
expectancy interest as a beneficiary under his former spouses
insurance policy. In the third group of cases, the language of the
property settlement agreement or decree of divorce is sufficiently
comprehensive to establish clearly that the spouse has waived or
relinquished any expectancy interest.

In such cases the decree of

divorce eliminates the former spouse's interest in proceeds of a
13

life insurance policy.
The facts of the present case seem to fall within the second
category of cases described in Culbertson except that the plaintiff
in the present case had no expectancy interest. Such interest, if
any,

was

"for

the

benefit

of

minor

child".

However,

the

stipulation is not sufficient to specifically grant an expectancy
interest in all of the proceeds since the minor son was merely a
secondary beneficiary of both policies at the time of the divorce.
A further complicating factor is that the decedent clearly acted to
change

the named primary beneficiary

of

each policy

to the

defendant prior to his death.
In Culbertson, the court indicated that since there was no
waiver of the defendant's expectancy interest in the decree the
following rule was applicable:
In consequence of the fact that ordinarily divorce does
not affect the right of the named beneficiary, it follows
that where the husband does not change the beneficiary of
his policy after having been divorced, the divorced wife
is entitled to the proceeds of the policy upon the death
of the insured. Id. at 914 citing 5 Couch on Insurance
2d, §29:4, P.267
In the case at hand there was no specific waiver of the expectancy
interest contained in the stipulation. However, exactly what that
expectancy interest was is far from clear.

The relevant language

of the stipulation falls squarely within the paragraph entitled
"Child Support and Insurance".

(Addendum A, p. 2,3). There are

four paragraphs under the child support and insurance portion of
the stipulation.

Paragraph one deals with the monthly child

support obligation which the decedent was required to pay, the
manner in which it was to be paid, and is reflective of the gross
income of each of the parties used in the calculation of child
14

support.

Paragraph two deals with the parties' obligation to

maintain medical and dental insurance for the minor child.
Paragraph three contains the language giving rise to the present
litigation regarding the life insurance policies.

Paragraph four

contains the provision for automatic withholding of income in the
event of the non-payment of child support.
The facts of the present case differ significantly from
Culbertson in that the decedent in the case at hand did in fact
change the name of the primary beneficiary on the insurance
policies in question. The Culbertson court ruled that there was no
triable issue of fact since the decedent failed to change the named
beneficiary.

The fact that the decedent in the case at hand

changed the named beneficiaries is indicative of the decedent's
intent to provide for his second wife and demonstrates that the
decedent did not understand the terms and conditions of paragraph
3 (c) of the stipulation as the trial court ruled in its Memorandum
Decision. The case at hand is further complicated by the fact that
the decree of divorce, which arguably is the document upon which
the decedent relied in making any decisions regarding the insurance
policies, did not contain the dispositive language of paragraph
3(c) of the stipulation.
In light of the foregoing facts, the trial court's findings in
paragraph 15 that the decedent and Mary Ellen Cutler knew and
understood what policies of insurance they had and intended to
continue in the future for the benefit of the minor child, along
with the fact that the child's receiving Social Security benefits
has no relevance are inequitable and contrary to the evidence.
Arguably the language contained in paragraphs 3 (a), (b), (c), and
15

(d) of

the

stipulation when read

for its cumulative

effect

indicates that the decedent intended to provide a way in which the
plaintiff could continue to have a sufficient means of support
during Clay Cutler's minority.

The cumulative effect of the

language contained in the child support and insurance paragraphs,
coupled with the less than clear language contained in paragraph
3(c) of the stipulation, and the fact that the decedent changed the
name of the primary beneficiary of each policy to the defendant,
lead to the conclusion that the decedent intended to provide for
his second wife in the event of his death.

This being the case,

the trial court erred in failing to consider equitable evidence and
arguments which may favor an award of all or part of the proceeds
to the defendant.
ARGUMENT
III.

SINCE THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING RESULTS IN
MANIFEST INJUSTICE TO THE DEFENDANT, THE
COURT OF APPEALS MAY FASHION ITS OWN REMEDY
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DEMANDS OF JUSTICE.

It is long been held that in equity cases the appellate court
is charged with the review of both the facts and the law and may
where the occasion warrants substitute its own judgment for that of
the trial court to fashion a remedy according to the demands of
justice where the trial court's disposition of the matter results
in manifest injustice.

Jackson v. Jackson. 616 P. 2d 338 (Utah

1980); Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P. 2d 1017 (Utah 1982) . Furthermore
this court may substitute its own judgment for that of the trial
court and fashion it own remedy according to the demands of
justice.

Jackson at 340.
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The trial court failed to consider competing equities between
the parties in rendering its decision.

Specifically, the trial

court indicated that the fact that Social Security benefits were
being paid to the plaintiff was irrelevant.

The trial court did

not consider the relative needs of the parties nor the obvious
intention of the decedent to provide for his spouse by designating
her as the named beneficiary.

All of these factors coupled with

the overall language of the stipulation urge at a minimum more
equitable division of the life insurance proceeds.
CONCLUSION
Given the fact that the standard of review for a motion for
summary judgment requires that the evidence be viewed and all
inferences be drawn and considered in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party, defendant contends that the evidence presented to
the trial court is insufficient to justify the court's ruling. The
judgment should therefore be reversed and the proceeds of the life
insurance policies awarded to the defendant, or at a minimum the
case should be remanded to the trial court for further hearing with
instructions

to divide the life insurance proceeds

equitably

between the parties.
DATED this

*£

day of October, 1993.

CHRISTOPHER^L. SHAW
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant
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I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
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84302, this
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Tab A

Thomas L. Willmore (#4256)
OLSON & HOGGAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
123 East Main Street
P. 0. Box 115
Tremonton, Utah 84337
Telephone: (801) 257-3885
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
MARY ELLEN CUTLER,
Plaintiff,
STIPULATION
Vs.

civil NO. &az&3ty

MARLON CUTLER,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff and the Defendant and in
consideration of the mutual convenants and conditions herein set
forth, the parties do stipulate, contract and agree one with the
other as follows:
WHEREAS, the Plaintiff has filed a Complaint for divorce;
and
WHEREAS, the parties are desirous of stipulating and
agreeing each with the other concerning the property and rights
of the parties on the issues of child custody, visitation, child
support, medical insurance, medical expenses, life insurance,
40GGAN
5 AT LAW

alimony, division of property, division of debts, retirement

CENTER
X 523
SH 8 4 3 2 1

plans and attorney's fees, and the parties respectfully request

2-1551

the Court to approve and grant the provisions of said agreement
N OFFICE:
IT MAIN
K 1 15

and incorporate them in any Divorce Decree which may be issued,

Number

ITAH 8 4 3 3 7
73883

FILED

NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereby agree with the other as
follows:
1.

Divorce.

Plaintiff shall be granted a Decree of Divorce

from the Defendant on her Complaint, said Decree to become final
upon signing by the Court.
2.

Custody and Visitation.

During the course of their

marriage, the parties have had two (2) children born as issue of
their marriage, namely:

CLAY S. CUTLER (born 3/25/76) and MARDI

ANN CUTLER (born 10/11/69).

Plaintiff and Defendant stipulate

and agree that they shall have joint custody and control of the
minor child, Clay S. Cutler.

The parties agree that Plaintiff is

to be the primary custodial parent with the minor child residing
with her and Defendant is to be the secondary custodial parent
with liberal and reasonable visitation rights.
The parties agree that if the minor child decides he wants
to reside with Defendant, and it is in the minor child's best
interest, and if Plaintiff, Defendant the the minor child are in
agreement, then he may reside with Defendant without this Court
issuing another order and Defendant's child support obligation
shall terminate while the minor child is residing with Defendant.
However, if the minor child resumes residing with Plaintiff, then
Defendant's child support obligation shall be reinstated as set
•LSON & HOGGAN
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

forth in paragraph 3.

5 6 WEST CENTER
P.O. OOX 5 2 5

LOGAN, UTAH 8432 1

3.

Child Support and Insurance.

(801)752 1551

(a)

Defendant agrees to pay to Plaintiff as and for the

TPEMONTON OFFICE:
123*A»T MAIN
lM Q N?afTuA!AM3J7
(801)2573885

support and maintenance of the minor child, the sum of $ 1150.00
per month until said child reaches the age of majority or

graduates from high school, whichever is later.

Said monthly

child support payment shall be paid in equal installments to
Plaintiff so that one-half '(1/2) is paid on or before the 5th day
of each month and the other one-half (1/2) is paid on or before
the 20th day of each month.
$150.00

Said child support payment of

per month is based upon Plaintiff's current monthly

gross income of $1875.00

and Defendant's current monthly gross

income of $1670.00.
(b)

Plaintiff and Defendant agree that both parties will

maintain medical and dental insurance upon the minor child of
«

the parties when it is available through their employment or any
other future employment.

Plaintiff and Defendant stipulate that

each shall be equally responsible for one-half (1/2) of the
deductible and any uncovered medical and dental expenses.
(c)

Plaintiff and Defendant agree that each will continue

in force and effect any life insurance policies that each party
currently has for the benefit of the minor child of the parties.
(d)

Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the withholding of

income is hereby authorized as a means of collecting child
support pursuant to U. C. A. Section 78-45(d)-1 et.seq.

Such

withholding will only occur if Defendant is delinquent in child
support as defined in Section 78-45(d)-1(4).
-IOGGAN

This provision will

remain effective until Defendant no longer owes child support to

> AT LAW
3EN1ER

<523

Plaintiff.

>H 84321
J-1531
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4.

Real Property.

Plaintiff and Defendant agree that

during the course of their marriage they have acquired a home

: HI
r-3885
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located at 607 South Tremont, Tremonton, Utah, which is more
particularly described as follows:
Beginning at a point North 88 41 ! East, 4097 feet from the
Northwest corner of the Southwest quarter of Section 10,
Township 11 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian and
running thence South 155.3 feet, South 89 1.5' East 348
feet; thence North 14 15' West 70 feet; thence North 62
35' East 228 feet crossing river; thence South 88 41f West
532 feet to the point of beginning, containing 1.64 acres.
The parties stipulate and agree that Defendant is to have the
home as his sole and separate property.

Plaintiff and Defendant

agree that there is approximately $30,000.00 of equity in the
home.

Defendant agrees to pay to the Plaintiff one-half (1/2) of

said equity interest or $15,000.00, which shall be paid by
Defendant to Plaintiff on or before August 1, 1992.
not obligated to pay interest on said obligation.

Defendant is
Defendant

agrees to execute a Promissory Note and Trust Deed securing the
payment of said amount to Plaintiff.

If Defendant sells the home

at a fair market value within three years of the date of divorce,
then Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the equity from the sale
shall be split equally between them and Defendant does not have
an obligation to pay the $15,000.00 as stated above.

Equity for

purposes of this document regarding the sale of the home is
defined as the sales price minus mortgage to Fireman's Fund,
realtor fees and closing costs.
5.
DLSON & HOGGAN
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Personal Property.

Except as set forth herein, the

parties have effected to their mutual satisfaction a division of

56 WEST CENTER
P.O. BOX 525
LOGAN. UTAH 8432 1
(801)752-1551
TREMONTON OFFICE:
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(801)2573865

all other personal property in which they had an interest, either
singularly or jointly.

(a)

Plaintiff shall have the following items of [visonal

property as her sole and separate property:
love seat
brown La-Z-Roy chair
microwave
floor mirror
hanging lamp
(upstairs)
vacuum cleaner
1/2 of dishes,
pots and pans,
towels and bedding
(b)

portable T. V.
wood rocking chair
dishwasher
dining room set
freezer
washer & dryer
phone
seat
end tables
lawn mower
gas grill
scanner
smal 1 appliances,
wall decor and knick-knacks
(except wood clock)
1977 Euick Skylark

Defendant shall have the following items of personal

property as his sole and separate property:
Refrigerator
Bedroom set
La-Z-Boy chair
Console T. V.
Front room wall mirror wood clock
barn scene
entry walls
saws (chain)
hanging lamp
1/2 of dishes,
(downstairs)
pets and pans,
1979 Chevrolet truck
towels and bedding hand tools
horse tack
one horse
(c)

cou^h
VCR
cowboy pictures
lawn mower
camping gear
horse trailer

power t o o l s
saddles

Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the 1988 Prowler 18-

foot travel trailer be sold or refinanced by Defendant to remove
Plaintiff's obligation therefrom.

If the trailer is sold,

Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the proceeds from the sale
are to be applied to the loan obligation for the trailer.
6.

Payment of Debts and Obligations.

Plaintiff agrees to

pay the following debts and obligations and to indemnify and hold
>N & HOGGAN

Defendant harmless therefrom:

Visa, Discovery Card, Bon Marche,

RNEYS AT LAW
WEST CENTtR
O. BOX 525

G.E.C.A.F., Weinstocks, vacuum cleaner purchase, First Security

N. UTAH 84321
)1)752 1551
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Bank, and any and all debts and obligations incurred
individually by her since the date of separation on or about July
1, 1989.

1)2573805
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Defendant agrees to pay the following debts and obiigat ions
and to indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom:
Firemanfs Fund house mortgage (approximately $38,500.00), cash
reserve with First Security Bank, Visa, Quick-Line First
Security, Greentrec Financing and Bank One, and any and all debt
and obligations incurred individually by him since the date of
separation on or about July 1, 1989.
7.

Retirement or Pension Funds.

The parties acknowledge

that Plaintiff has a retirement or pension fund through her
employment with Thiokol Corporation and that Defendant has a
retirement or pension fund through his employment with Utah Stat
Retirement. The parties stipulate and agree that each party shal
have his or her retirement or pension fund as his or }v-:r sole an
separate property and that neither party shall claim any interes
in the other party's pension or retirement fund.

Each party

forever waives any claim to either party's pension or retirement
funds.
8.

Preparation of Documents.

It is expressly understood

between the parties that this Stipulation has been prepared by
Plaintiff's attorney who is Thomas L. Willmore.

Defendant

acknowledges that Plaintiff's attorney has explained to him his
right to retain independent legal counsel or such other advice c
he may deem in his best interest to review the Stipulation and
OLSON & HOGGAN
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

the terms, provisions and conditions thereof and that this

56 WEST CENTER
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Stipulation is entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant aftf-

(601)7521 551

having received such advice and counsel and after having made
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such examination as he deems in his best interest.

9.

Attorney's Fees and Costs of Court.

Th e pa r 1; j e s

stipulate and agree that each shall be responsible for the
attorney's fees and costs of Court that each has incurred in t.his
matter, if this divorce is obtained upon this Stipulation.
Should a default arise under this Stipulation and its terms, the
Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the party creating the default
agrees to pay all costs and reasonable attorney's fees to resolve
the dispute or enforce the terms and conditions of this
Stipulation.
10.

Duty to Cooperate.

Both parties agree to execute and

deliver to the other party, within thirty clays of the'date of
entry of the Divorce Decree, if any, any and all documents and
other property necessary to effect the intent of this
Stipulation.
11.

Voluntary Contract.

Plaintiff and Defendant

acknowledge that they execute this Stipulation of their own free
will and choice, believing it to be in their best interest and in
the best interest of the parties' minor child.
12.

Disclosure.

Each of the parties acknowledge that a

full and complete disclosure of all property and debts incurred
or acquired during their marriage has been made and should other
assets or debts later be discovered, an equitable order would
SI & HOGGAN

have to be entered at such time.

*NEYS AT LAW
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13.

Waiver.

Defendant, by his signature, hereby enters his

D. BOX 5 2 5
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appearance in this matter and specifically waives any further
notice of the proceedings herein, and does hereby consent that

Plaintiff may take judgment for divorce as prayed for in her
Complaint, provided the provisions of said Decree correspond wit
the provisions of this Settlement Agreement.
DATED this

lju

day of M y , 1989.

1
;
rikuift
A\
(
/////4
Mary M i e n C u t l e r
DATED this

Hh
\&-

day of e*rf^, 1 9 8 9 .

A&=w_
^f)\p l\r^ \ .jjtcA
Marlon Cutler

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Box E l d e r )

ss,

Subscribed and sworn to before me by MARY ELLEN CUTLER, th*
.
.
Plamtiff,

this

.-Hi
/S

dtljUoJd a y of JA*%, 1 9 8 9 .

tialit
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STATE OF UTAH
County of Box E l d e r )

ss,

Subscribed and sworn to before me by MARLON CUTLER, the
Defendant, this

/^ ~

day of 'Jawy, 1989.

0
NOTA^Y PUBLIC,-jjy
R e s i d i n g a t iTi-cmO'Tho,

Ll.t~
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Thomas L. Willmore (34256)
OLSON & HOGGAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
123 East Main
P. 0. Box 115
Tremonton, Utah 84337
Telephone: 257-3885
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
MARY ELLEN CUTLER,
Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Vs .
MARLON CUTLER,

Civil No.
Defendant.

This matter came on for hearing at 1 o'clock p.m. on August
21, 1989, in the Court Room in the Hall of Justice at Brigham
City, Box Elder County, Utah, the Honorable F.L. Gunnel!
presiding.

The Plaintiff was present in person and was

represented by her Attorney, Thomas L. Willmore, of the Law Firm
of OLSON & HOGGAN.

The Defendant was not present in person and

was not represented by counsel.

Plaintiff was sworn and

testified, and the Court having heard the testimony, and being
fully advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, now therefore,
lOGGAN

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows:
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1.

Plaintiff, MARY ELLEN CUTLER, is hereby awarded a

H 84321
M551

Decree of Divorce from Defendant, MARLON CUTLER, the same to

N OFFICE

become final and absolute the date of entry hereof.
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2.

The Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby awarded the joint

care, custody and control of the minor child of the parties,
namely:

CLAY S. CUTLER, (born 3/25/76).

Plaintiff is awarded

the primary custody of the minor child residing with her and
Defendant is awarded the secondary custody of the minor child
with liberal and reasonable visitation rights.
3.

Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to the Plaintiff as

and for child support the sum of $150 per month for the minor
child commencing September 1, 1989, and payable one-half (1/2) on
or before the 5th cf each month and the other half on or before
the 20th of each month.
4.

It is hereby ordered that the parties home located at

60 7 South Trejnont, Tremonton, Box Elder County, Utah, which is
more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at a point North 88 41 f East, 4097 feet from the
Northwest corner of the Southwest quarter of Section 10,
Township 11 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian and
running thence South 155.3 feet, South 89 151 East 348
feet; thence North 14 15f West 70 feet; thence North 62
35f East 228 feet crossing river; thence South 88 41 f West
532 feet to the point of beginning, containing 1.64 acres.
shall awarded to Defendant subject to a $15,000.00 lien to
Plaintiff.

Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff her equity

interest of $15,000.00 on or before August 1, 1992. If Defendant
sells the home at a fair market value within three (3) years of
the date of divorce, then the equity is ordered to be divided
>LSON & HOGGAN
ATTORNFYS AT LAW

equally between Plaintiff and Defendant.

Equity is defined as

5 6 WEST CENTER
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the sales price minus mortgage to Fireman's Fund, realtor fees
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and closing costs.
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5.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded the personal property now in
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her possession, love seat, brown La-Z-Boy chair, microwave, floor

(801)257-3885
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mirror, hanging lamp (upstairs), vacuum cleaner, 1/2 of dishes,
pots and pans and towels and bedding, wood rocking chair, dining
room set, washer & dryer, end tables, lawn mower, scanner, wall
decor and knick-knacks (except wood clock) 1977 Buick Skylark,
portable T.V., dishwasher, freezer, phone seat, gas grill, small
appliances, together with all personal property and personal
effects which she owned prior to marriage.
6.

Defendant is hereby awarded the personal property now in

his possession, refrigerator, La-Z-Boy chair, front room wall
mirror, barn scene, saws (chain) 1/2 of dishes, pots and panss,
and towels and bedding, horse tack, bedroom set, console T.V.,
wood clock, entry walls, hanging lamp (downstairs), 1979
Chevrolet truck, hand tools, one horse, couch, VCR, cowboy
pictures, lawn mower, camping gear, horse trailer, power tools,
saddles, together with all personal property and personal effects
which he owned prior to marriage.
7.

Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby ordered to maintain

health and dental insurance upon the minor child of the parties
through their employment or any other future employment.
Plaintiff and Defendant shall equally be responsible for the
deductible and any uncovered medical expenses.
8.

Plaintiff is hereby ordered to assume and pay the

following debts and obligations and shall indemnify and hold
kHOGGAN

Defendant harmless therefrom: Visa, Discovery Card, Bon Marche,
r
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G.E.C.A.F., Weinstocks, vacuum cleaner purchase, F i r s t

Security
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Bank and all debts and obligations incurred individually by her
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since the date of separation.
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9.

Defendant i s hereby ordered to assume and pay the
3

following debts and obligations and shall indemnify and hold
Plaintiff harmless therefrom:

Fireman's Fund house mortgage

(approximately $38,500.00), cash reserve with First Security
Bank, Visa, Quick-Line First Security, Greentree Financing and
Bank One, and all debts and obligations incurred individually by
him since the date of separation.
10.

It is hereby ordered that neither Plaintiff nor

Defendant shall have any right or claim for alimony from the
other, because each has waived any rights because of their
ability to provide income for themselves.
11.

Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby awarded their own

pension or retirement fund that each has acquired with their
employer, and each party has waived any cl.aim that they
may have in the other parties1 pension or retirement fund.
12.

Each party is hereby ordered to be responsible for any

attorney's fees that each has incurred in this matter.
13.

Each party is hereby ordered to immediately execute and

deliver one to the other all documents and property necessary to
effectuate this Decree of Divorce.

DATED t h i s

,j^ /

day of August, 1989

>LSON & HOGGAN
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District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Decree of
Divorce upon the Defendant by mailing a true and correct copy
thereof, postage prepaid in Tremonton, Utah, to the Defendant,
Marlon Cutler, 607 South Tremont, Tremonton, 84337, this
c^ /"

day of August, 1989.

Sec/reta

cutler.dec/Tl

i a HOGGAN
NEYS AT LAW
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
STATE OF UTAH

CLAY 3. CUTLER, by and through ]
MARY ELLEN CUTLER, his
'
guardian,
]
Plaintiffs
vs.

]1

MEMORANDUM DECISION

]1

CASE NO. 920000013

LINDA CUTLER,
Defendant

.]

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE the Court on a Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Most

of

parties' memoranda

the

issues addressed, in the respective

were addressed

in detail

in court on a

hearing conducted the 9th day of October, 1992.
At that hearing both parties

submitted,

by proffer

and

argument, the facts of the case and both admitted that the
Court would not benefit by further testimony.

In addition, the

Defendant, in her Responsive Memorandum, accepts the facts as
stated in the Plaintiff's Memorandum.
This becomes pertinent in any Motion for Summary Judgment,
but in particular here because the Court

is called upon to

Interpret and apply certain language found in the Stipulation
and

Findings.

The

Defendant
the

facts

has
must

argued
be

that

because

considered

in

of

ambiguities,

all

that

construction.

The Court will operate on the premises that all

Cutler vs. Cutler
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pertinent facts are before it now and that a full trial would
not enlighten the Court further thereon.
Of some interest is that the operative provisions in the
Stipulation
likewise

in

relative

to

the

insurance .benefits

the Findings, but#

omitted, from the Decree.

apparently

were

found

through oversight

The Defendant has argued that the

Deceased was not therefore bound thereby or at the least he may
not have been aware of the language as people would ordinarily
only review the Decree of Divorce and not the Findings.

The

Affidavit of Mr. Thomas L. Willmore indicates that the Deceased
read and discussed the contents, terms and provisions of not
only the Stipulation but likewise the Findings.

As to that

aspect, this Court holds that the Deceased was bound by the
terms and provisions of the Stipulation, which he obviously
read and signed and by the Findings just as if the provisions
were found in the Decree.
Of other minor concern is with respect to the knowledge, if
any, by

the Defendant

the

Deceased

relative to his handling of the insurance policies

and the

named beneficiaries.

of

the

restriction

on

The proffer was made that she was unaware

of the restriction.
The rights of the Defendant cannot be enlarged by the fact
of her marriage, nor her understanding or lack of understanding

Cutler vs. Cutler
#920000013
Page 3

with

respect

Stipulation

to
and

the

restrictions

Decree

of

Divorce.

and

provisions

There

could

in
be

the
some

argument made that since she was married to the Deceased at the
time of his death and that equity should work in her favor and
that the Court should find her to be the lawful beneficiary of
the

policies.

equity.

This

case

concerns

both

contract

law

and

Contract in the Stipulation and between the Deceased

and the Plaintiffs guardian and contract between Deceased and
the insurance companies.
with

respect

to

the

Equity, of course, comes in to play

Divorce

Decree

in

its

entirety,

the

application of fairness with respect to the treatment of the
language in the Stipulation and Findings and its effect upon
the child, together with the claims by the Defendant for equity
relative to her relationship to the Deceased.

Moreover, it is

equity which the Plarntiff seeks in having the funds taken from
the Defendant and provided for the minor child.
The language of the Stipulation and Findings may be argued
to be less than entirely clear, in that it could be interpreted
to mean that the parties will agree to continue in force and
effect any life insurance policies which each party then had
for

the benefit

of

the minor

child

of

the

parties.

The

question then being whether that means that the policies if any
would continue in force as they then were, where the minor

Cutler vs. Cutler
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child or children was then named beneficiarys or whether the
policies that existed were to remain in effect, not as they
perhaps then existed, but in the future for the benefit of the
minor parties necessitating a change in the named beneficiary
of the policies.
The

notes

of Attorney Willmore

policy referred

indicate

that

the

only

to was that provided by the State [the Gem

State Insurance Policy] of $43,000,00.

The Provident Life and

Accident Policy may or may not have been included, but was not
mentioned in the notes.
at

the

time

of

The facts however are that apparently

the Decree, the named

beneficiary was the

Plaintiff's guardian, with the children being
beneficiaries.

the contingent

The intent seems to be clear that the parties

intended, subsequent to the Decree, that only the minor child
of the parties be named beneficiary.
there are other matters less so.
is what
minor

As clear as that may be,

One question which may arise

is to be done pursuant to the Stipulation once the

child

reaches

the

age of majority.

Nothing

in

the

Stipulation provides guidance, but it could perhaps be argued
that once the minor child

reaches the age of majority, the

restriction on the Deceased's right to change beneficiaries is
then lifted.
A few months after the Decree was entered and not entirely

Cutler vs. Cutler
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consistent with the Decree, the named beneficiary
from

the Plaintiffs

parties,

one

Deceased's

being

guardian
an

remarriage

the

changed

to the two (2) children of the

adult.
to

was

Later

and

Defendant,

subsequent
the

adult

to

child was

deleted and the Defendant and the minor child were named.
Defendant has argued that since the Deceased

the deletion of the adult child would

The

first named both

children as beneficiaries, he obviously did not understand
terms and provisions of the Stipulation,

the

the

After the remarriage,

indicate however to the

contrary.
Some argument was made of the fact that at the time of the
divorce

there was

the minor

a policy providing coverage on the life of

child.

The Court

finds

that

to be

irrelevant,

as

that is of no benefit to the minor child, but likely for the
benefit of the parents only.
This Court's task then is to determine what was meant and
understood by the parties and then what

powers

equity

those

should

be

exercised

to

enforce

in law

and/or

intentions.

In

that regard the Court finds that the fact that the Deceased was
not

represented

considered
Stipulation

to

by
be

into

counsel,

has

competent

and

which

he

no

entered.

relevance,

able
The

to

as

he

understand

notes

Willmore and his Affidavit would confirm the same.

of

was
the

Attorney

Further,
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paragraph 8 of the Stipulation is dispositive.
As to the lack of specificity in the Stipulation and in the
Findings raising a question as to whether or not the policy was
then in force or actually what was being referred to in the
language/

the

Court

presumes

that

the

parties

knew

and

understood what policies of insurance they had and intended to
continue in the future for the benefit of the minor child.
The suggestion that the policies constituted the extent of
the "estate" of the Deceased is not only inaccurate, [as they
were not part of the "estate"], but irrelevant.

Likewise that

the receipt by the child of social security benefits has no
relevance, nor is there any indication that the insurance was
to provide for the minor child only in lieu of child support.
That was however, likely part of the thinking of the parties,
but it does not change or affect the decision of the Court.
Although the Court is not insensitive to the concerns of
the Defendant, and the hardship caused

by the loss of the

insurance benefits, the Court must/ by equity, do what should
have been done.
case

and

for

After considering the various factors in this
the

reasons

set

forth

in

the

Plaintiff's

Memorandum is Support of the Motions for Summary Judgment, the
Supplemental Memorandum, together with Affidavits

is support

thereof and for the reasons set forth hereinabove, the Motion

Cutler vs. Cutler
#920000013
Page 7

for Summary Judgment is granted in the favor of the Plaintiff,
Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to prepare a formal
Judgment and Order in conformance herewith.
Dated this 17th day of November, 1992. .
BY THE COUPT

£

"Gordon J. Low
District Court Judge

Case No: 920000013 CV
Certificate of Mailing
V
day of
I certify that on the

• ' • . ' ( / / / • ' •

•,/

i

I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the
attached document to the following:
REED HADFIELD
Atty for Plaintiff
P.O. BOX 876
BRIGHAM CITY UT 84302-0906

QUINN D HUNSAKER
Atty for Defendant
102 SOUTH FIRST WEST
P 0 BOX 461
BRIGHAM UT 84302
District Court Clerk

By: • f'U-r/y^A-XyJqtev^
r D e p u t y Clerk
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Reed W. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thome #1289
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main
P. O. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876
Telephone: 723-3404
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

CLAY S. CUTLER by and through ;
MARY ELLEN CUTLER, his
Guardian,
]I
Plaintiff,

;

vs.

]

LINDA CUTLER,

]I

Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 920000013CV

;

This matter having come on regularly for oral arguments
before the above-entitled court on the 9th day of October, 1992
before the Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Judge, pursuant to a
Motion for Summary Judgment having been filed by the plaintiff;
each of the parties having been given the opportunity to submit
memoranda and authorities in support of their position and the
Judge of said court, after taking said matter under advisement,
has made and entered his written Memorandum Decision granting the
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and pursuant thereto the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law constituting

( m

A 1993
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the decision of the court are hereby made and entered on Motion
of Reed W. Hadfield, attorney for the plaintiff:
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1.

The plaintiff, Clay S. Cutler, is the minor child of

Mary Ellen Cutler and Marlon Cutler.

On August 21, 1989 the

above-entitled court granted to Mary Ellen Cutler a Decree of
Divorce from Marlon Cutler, said case being Civil No. 890000384.
The Findings of Fact entered by the court on the same date
contain the following:
"(3) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that each will
continue in force and effect any life insurance
policies that each party currently has for the benefit
of-the minor child of the parties."
2.

The Decree and Findings were based upon a Stipulation

entered into between said parties, which Stipulation was signed
by Mary Ellen Cutler dated the 14th day of August, 1989 and by
Marlon Cutler dated the 15th day of August, 1989 and which
Stipulation contained the following:
"(c) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that each will
continue in force and effect any life insurance
policies that each party currently has for the benefit
of the minor child of the parties."
3.

During the month of August, 1989 at the time the

Stipulation was entered into and at the time the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Decree were entered by the court,

2
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Marlon S. Cutler had in effect two life insurance policies on his
life, which policies were as follows:
(a)

Gem Insurance Company in the amount of

$43,000.00 (see copy of letter from Utah Retirement
Systems - R. Scott Hansen dated June 17, 1992, attached
to plaintiff's Memorandum as Exhibit 1 ) .
(b)

Provident Life and Accident Company in the

amount of $13,758.62 (see copies of letters from Utah
Retirement System - Sherrie Archibald attached to
plaintiff's Memorandum as Exhibit 2 ) .
4.

Marlon S. Cutler aka Marlon Cutler died January 11,

5.

On or about January 28, 1992 Gem Insurance Company paid

1992.

to Linda Cutler, -deceased's present wife, the sum of $43,000^00
representing life insurance death benefits on the life of Marlon
S. Cutler aka Marlon Cutler (see defendant's Answers to
plaintiff's Interrogatories).
6.

On or about February 27, 1992 Provident Life and

Accident Company paid to Linda Cutler, deceased's present wife,
the sum of $13,758.62, being life insurance proceeds on the life
of Marlon S. Cutler aka Marlon Cutler (see defendant's Answers to
plaintiff's Interrogatories).

3
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7.

On the 28th day of February 1992 the above-entitled

court entered an Order on Order to Show Cause which provided in
effect, as follows:
(a)

That the $43,0000.00 that was the life

insurance proceeds received from Gem Insurance Company
had been invested in a home to the extent of
$41,424.25, which home is described as:
Lot 3, Block 9, Plat A, Tremonton Townsite Survey.
The balance of said insurance proceeds had been used to
pay the funeral and burial expenses of Marlon S. Cutler
aka Marlon Cutler.

That the home and real property was

placed in a constructive trust in accordance with the
provisions of said Order.
(b)

Any additional life insurance proceeds that

were received on the life of Marlon S. Cutler aka
Marlon Cutler were to be placed in an interest bearing
bank account and to be held in a constructive trust and
not to be withdrawn except upon further Order of the
court •*
(c)

That the sum of $13,758.62 received from

Provident Life and Accident Company has been placed in
an interest bearing account at First Security Bank in

4
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accordance with the court Order (see defendant's
Answers to plaintiff's Interrogatories).
8.

The Affidavit of Mr. Thomas L. Willmore indicates that

the deceased read and discussed the contents, terms and
provisions of not only the Stipulation but likewise the Findings.
As to that aspect the court finds that the deceased was bound by
the terms and provisions of the Stipulation which he obviously
read and signed and by the Findings just as if the provisions
were found in the Decree.
9.

The court finds that whether the defendant was aware or

was unaware of the restrictions found in the Stipulation and
Findings of the divorce is of no consequence.

The rights of the

defendant cannot be enlarged by the fact of her marriage, nor her
understanding or lack of understanding with respect to the
restrictions and provisions in the Stipulation and Decree of
Divorce.
10-.

The court finds that this case concerns both contract

law and equity.
11.

The notes of Attorney Willmore indicate that the only

policy referred to was that provided by the state (the Gem State
insurance policy) of $43,000.00.

The Provident Life and Accident

policy may or may not have been included, but was not mentioned
in the notes.

The facts are, however, that apparently at the
5
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time of the Decree the named beneficiary was the plaintiff's
guardian with the children being the contingent beneficiaries.
The intent seems to be clear that the parties intended subsequent
to the Decree that only the minor child of the parties be named
beneficiary.
12.

The court finds that a few months after the Decree was

entered and not entirely consistent with the Decree the named
beneficiary was changed from the plaintiff's guardian to t*\e two
(2) children of the parties, one being an adult.

Later and

subsequent to deceased's marriage to the defendant the adult
child was deleted and the defendant and the minor child were
named.

The court finds that since the deceased first named both

children as beneficiaries, and that after his remarriage he
deleted the adult childf that this indicates that the deceased
did understand the terms and provisions of the Stipulation.
13.

The court finds that whether or not there was a policy

providing coverage on the life of the minor child is irrelevant
as that is of no benefit to the minor child but likely for the
benefit of the parents only.
14. The court finds that the fact that the deceased was not
represented by counsel has no relevance as he was considered to
be competent and able to understand the Stipulation into which he
entered.

The notes of Attorney Willmore and his Affidavit would
6
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confirm the same.

Further, paragraph 8 of the Stipulation is

dispositive.
15.

The court finds that the parties knew and understood

what policies of insurance they had and intended to continue in
the future for the benefit of the minor child.
16.

The court finds that the insurance policies were not a

part of the estate of the deceased.
17.

The court finds that the receipt by the child of* social

security benefits has no relevance, nor is there any indication
that the insurance was to provide for the minor child only in
lieu of child support.
18.

The court finds after considering the various factors

in this case for the reasons set forth in the plaintiff's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Supplemental Memorandum, together with Affidavits in support
thereof, and for the reason set forth in the court's Memorandum
Decision, the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in favor of
the plaintiff.
19.

That there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.

AS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FROM THE FOREGOING FACTS THE COURT
FINDS:
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1.

That a judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff and

against the defendant for the life insurance proceeds that have
previously been paid to the defendant on the life of Marlon
Cutler, which life insurance proceeds are as follows:
(a)

Gem Insurance Company in the amount of $43,000.00.

(b)

Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company in
the amount of $13,758.62.

2.

The life insurance proceeds that have been placed in an

interest bearing bank account and are being held in a
constructive trust and not to be withdrawn except upon further
order of this court are hereby ordered to be delivered to the
plaintiff immediately and said amount to be applied to the above
judgment.
3.

That the home and real property that has been acquired

by the defendant and which is located in Box Elder County, Utah
and more particularly described as follows, to-wit:
Lot 3, Block 9, Plat A, Tremonton Townsite Survey.
Together with all rights belonging thereto,
which is being held in a constructive trust pursuant to an Order
on Order to Show Cause on the express conditions that the home is
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to remain free and clear of all liens and encumbrances and no
lien or encumbrance is to be placed upon said property until the
further Order of this court, shall remain in said constructive
trust and the express conditions contained therein that the home
remain free and clear of all liens and encumbrances and no lien
or encumbrance be placed against said property, are to continue
in full force and effect.

The defendant is given ten (10) days

from the entry of judgment within which to pay the entire •
proceeds of $43,000.00 to the plaintiff.

In the event said sum

is not paid within said ten day period, the plaintiff shall be
entitled to either obtain an Execution or to proceed without an
Execution to have said home sold, with the defendant to execute
the necessary documents to complete the sale and the proceeds of
sale shall be applied to the judgment hereinabove set forth.
4.

That interest at the rate of ten (10%) percent per annum

shall be paid on said insurance proceeds from the date said
insurance proceeds were received by the defendant (which dates
would have been on or about January 28, 1992, on the $43,000.00
and on or about February 27, 1992, on the $13,758.62) until date
of judgment and at the rate of twelve (12%) percent per annum
from date of judgment until paid.
Let judgment be entered accordingly.
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DATED this

'Y

day of December, 199ji.
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the within Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law this / 7
day
of December, 1992, to the defendant's attorney, Quinn D.
Hunsaker, Molgard and Hunsaker, 102 South 1st West, P. O. Box
461, Brigham City, Utah 84302 and to Linda Cutler, 40 East 100
North, Tremonton, Utah 84337 (Attorney Quinn Hunsaker having
filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel dated December 8 ; 1992).
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Reed W. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne #1289
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main
P. 0. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876
Telephone: 723-34 04
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
CLAY S. CUTLER by and through
MARY ELLEN CUTLER, his
Guardian,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT

vs.
Civil No. 920000013CV

LINDA CUTLER,
Defendant.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and
Order entered by this court on January 5, 1993 shall remain in
full force and effect except that paragraphs 3, 11 and 12 of said
Findings shall be amended to read as follows:
M

8.

The Affidavits of Mr. Thomas L. Willmore and

Mary Ellen Cutler with accompanying attachments
indicate that the deceased read and discussed the
contents, terms and provisions of not only the
Stipulation but likewise the Findings.

As to that

aspect, the court finds that the deceased was bound by
the terms and provisions of the Stipulation which he

MICROFILMED
P a t t ^ ^ R o l l No. /£-_,

0)Q/t

MAj} 2 4 199J
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obviously read and signed and by the Findings just as
if the provisions were found in the Decree.
11.

Neither the Gem State insurance policy for

$43,000.00 nor the Provident Life and Accident
insurance policy for $13,758.62 were specifically
referred to in the notes of Attorney Thomas Willmore.
Both policies were, however, provided by the State and
the notes of Thomas Willmore stated:

"Life

insurance - - both will maintain for benefit of
Clay - - Mary Ellen's with Thiokol - - Marlon's with
State."

At the time of the Divorce Decree (August 21,

1989), the primary beneficiary of the $43,000.00 Gem
State insurance policy was Mardi Ann Cutler, the
decedent's daughter, who was over the age of majority.
The decedent's minor son, Clay S. Cutler, was the
secondary beneficiary.

The named beneficiary at the

time of the Divorce Decree on the $13,758.62 Provident
Life and Accident insurance policy was the decedent's
mother, Beth Cutler, and his minor son, Clay S. Cutler,
was the secondary or alternate beneficiary.
12.

The court finds that on or about November 22,

1989 the decedent changed the named beneficiary on the
Provident Life and Accident insurance policy from
2
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decedent's mother to his adult daughter, Mardi Ann
Cutler, and his minor son, Clay S. Cutler, as cobeneficiaries.

In July of 1990 decedent changed the

Provident Life and Accident insurance in the sum of
$13,758.62 to his second wife, Linda Cutler, as primary
beneficiary and his minor son, Clay Cutler, as
secondary beneficiary.

At the time of the divorce

Mardi Ann Cutler was the named beneficiary of the
$43,000.00 Gem State term insurance policy while the
decedent's minor son, Clay S. Cutler was a secondary
beneficiary.

In July of 1990 the decedent changed the

beneficiary on the Gem State insurance policy in the
sum of $43,000.00 to his second wife, Linda Cutler, as
primary beneficiary while his minor son, Clay S.
Cutler, remained as secondary beneficiary.
DATED this Mj

day of March, 1993^" / ^ '
''s

sis?

^ S T R I C T JUDGE
APPROVE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed
the within Amanded Findings of Fact
1993, to the defendant's attorneys,
Christopher L. Shaw, Gridley, Ward,
Street, Ogden, Utah 84401.

tr/11:cutler.afd
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a true and
this ffim
Findley P.
Hamilton &

correct copy of
day of March,
Gridley and
Shaw, 635 25th
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AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS L. WILLMORE
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
County of Box Elder )
THOMAS L. WILLMORE, being first duly swornf deposes and says:
1. That I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the
State of Utah.
2.
That in July and August, 1989f I was contacted and
retained by Mary Ellen Cutler regarding a divorce action she wanted
to file against her husband, Marlon Cutler.
3. I was first contacted by Mrs. Cutler on July 6f 1989. She
came to my office and I met with her.
4. I had another conference with Mrs. Cutler on July 7, 1989
«

in which I discussed with her the issues involved in a divorce
action.
5. One of the issues that I discussed with Mrs. Cutler was
her life insurance and Mr. Cutler's life insurance being maintained
for the benefit of their minor child, Clay Cutler. My notes of
July 7, 1989 indicate as follows:
"Life insurance—both will
maintain for benefit of Clay—Mary Ellen's with Thiokol—Marlon's
with State."
6. This is the only reference in my notes concerning life
insurance and it is my recollection that I discussed with Mrs.
Cutler that the life insurance of both Mr. and Mrs. Cutler would be
maintained for the benefit of their minor child, Clay Cutler.
7. All information that I received for this divorce action
was from Mrs. Cutler. I did not receive any information from Mr.
Cutler and I did not have any discussions or negotiations with Mr.
Cutler or anyone representing him.
8. On August 14, 1989, I received a telephone message from
Mrs. Cutler asking that I proceed to have the divorce action filed
and set for a default hearing. After I spoke with her, I prepared
a Stipulation incorporating the information she had provided to me.
9. I reviewed the Stipulation with Mrs. Cutler in detail and
she was in agreement with all of the provisions set forth in the
Stipulation.

2
10.
Mrs. Cutler appeared in my office and signed the
Stipulation on August 14, 1989 in front of my secretary, Leslie
Morrison, who is a Notary Public.
11.
Mr. Cutler appeared in my office and signed the
Stipulation, Promissory Note and Trust Deed on August 15, 1989 in
front of my secretary, Marie Riggs, who is Notary Public.
12. A default divorce hearing was held on August 21, 1989
before the Honorable F. L. Gunnell. On that date, Judge Gunnell
signed and entered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce.
13. On August 21, 1989, I prepared a letter addressed to Mr.
Cutler at 607 South Tremont Street, Tremonton, Utah 84337, and
«

mailed the letter together with copies of the Decree of Divorce,
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order to Withhold and
Deliver. I indicated in my letter to him that the divorce was
heard on August 21, 1989 and that if he had any questions or
problems concerning the documents that he needed to contact his
attorney immediately.
A copy of my August 21, 1989 letter is
attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
14. Further the Affiant sayeth not.
*
Ttfibmas L. Willmbfe

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of October,
^cs^5355*^

1992.

/%2€\ #fe^ fan,
f / T» t? \ t)

NOTAW P U B L I C A

9Wi*jLi!
\
Va,
.cfl-/ a
\dVNb 22. V>Xv J?

Residing at: Tremonton, Utah
Commission Expires: 11-22-92

cutlr)tlw.aff/tlw

EXHIBIT "A"
OLSON

6

HOGGAN

ATTORNEYS AT

LAW

L. BRENT H O G G A N

5 6 W E S T CENTER

MILES P. JENSEN

PO

BRAD H. BEARNSON.
THOMAS L
MARLIN J

BOX 5 2 5

LOGAN. UTAH 64321

BRUCE L. JORGEN5EN
PC

T E L E P H O N E (601) 751 1551

WILLMORE

TELEFAX (601) 753 8 6 9 9

GRANT

August 21, 1989

Of COUNJtt

T R E M O N T O N OFHCE.
183 EAST M A I N

W I L U A M L FILLMORE

P.O

BOX 115

TREMONTON. UTAH 64337
CHARLES P. OLSON (191*1975)
T E L E P H O N E (601) 1 5 7 - 3 6 6 5

Marlon Cutler
607 South Tremont
Tremontonf Utah 84 337
Re:

Cutler vs. Cutler
Our File No. T-1165

Dear Mr. Cutler:
Enclosed you will find conformed copies of the following
documents: Decree of Divorce, Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law & Order to Withhold and Deliver. The divorce was heard on
August 21, 1989, and Judge Gunnell signed these documents. Please
review these documents, and if you have any questions or problems
with them you need to contact your attorney immediately.
Sincerely,
OLSON & HOGGAN

Thomas L. Willmore
TLW/lm
encs
cutler.ltr/T1
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Reed W. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thome #1289
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main
P. 0. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876
Telephone: 723-3404
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

CLAY S. CUTLER, by and
through MARY ELLEN CUTLER,
his Guardian,
Plaintiff,

;
]|
]|

vs.

)

LINDA CUTLER,

]

Defendant.

AFFIDAVIT OF MARY ELLEN
CUTLER nka MARY ELLEN
BUTLER
Civil No. 920000013CV

]

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER )
Mary Ellen Cutler nka Mary Ellen Butler being first duly
sworn deposes and says:
1.

I am the natural mother of Clay S. Cutler and the duly

appointed guardian ad litem of Clay S. Cutler, who is the
plaintiff in the above-entitled action.
2.

Prior to contacting Attorney Thomas L. Willmore in early

July of 1989, Marlon Cutler and myself discussed obtaining a
divorce.

We discussed the possibility of entering into a

Property Settlement Agreement•

It was decided at that time that

both parties would keep in effect all of their present life
insurance policies for the benefit of the minor child, Clay S.
Cutler.

Various other terms and conditions were agreed upon.

On

or about July 6th or 7th, 1989 I contacted Attorney Thomas L.
Willmore concerning obtaining a divorce for me from my husband,
Marlon Cutler.
3.

In my discussions with Attorney Willmore I advised him

as to the things we had agreed upon, including the fact that each
of us were to maintain our present life insurance policies, which
life insurance policies were to be maintained for the benefit of
our only minor child, Clay S. Cutler.
,f ff

A

Attached hereto as Exhibit

is a copy of a letter to Marlon Cutler from the Utah State

Retirement Board dated July 21, 1989.

This letter was during the

time the Property Settlement Agreement was being worked out and
was prior to Marlon's signing the Stipulation on August 15, 1989.
4.

Marlon and I had several discussions concerning what

would be in the best interests of Clay and what Marlon felt would
be fair to him financially.
5.
on Clay.

We both agreed to maintain medical and dental insurance
We both agreed to maintain our present life insurance

policies for the benefit of Clay.

Our discussions were

specifically that each of us would maintain for the benefit of
Clay all life insurance policies that each of us had in effect at
that time.

(See copy of Attorney Thomas L. Willmorefs notes

attached hereto as Exhibit

lf lf

B ).
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6.

I agreed to accept $26.00 less a month from what was

calculated on the Child Support Obligation Worksheet (see copy of
worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit "C").

I further agreed to

not require any alimony and we both agreed that each would retain
our own retirement benefits even though his retirement benefits
were greater than mine.
7.

All of the terms and conditions of our stipulation were

negotiated and agreed to between us and various adjustments and
concessions were made by each of us to the other in arriving at
all of the terms and conditions of said stipulation.
8.

The entire stipulation was a "give and take" arrangement

on the part of both parties and the stipulation that was finally
signed represented the final agreement after all of the terms and
conditions had been worked out.
9.

I had carefully considered all of the terms and

conditions of the stipulation, as had Marlon, and firmly believed
that all of said terms and conditions were important to me.

The

life insurance was an important provision for me as I was most
concerned about the welfare of Clay S. Cutler.
Further affiant sayeth not.
DATED this

/y

day of October, 1992.

MARY /ELLEN CUTLER nka
MARY ELLEN BUTLER
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On the /? day of October, 1992 personally appeared before
me Mary Ellen Cutler nka Mary Ellen Butler, the signer of the
within instrument who duly acknowledged to me that she executed
the same.
NOTARY nnuc

^?b^K
^y^''V£\i\

REEDW.HADFIhLD
98 North Main

5#l'i7
StateclUtan
"<l.-S-y
MyComm.Expires1/3/91
tr/1:cutler.aff^
feSi.

»

,/V 9fJ,JJ,J

NbTARY PUBLL-

Residing a^Brigham City, Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the /?
day of October, 1992 I
hand delivered a true and correct copy of the within Affidavit of
Mary Ellen Cutler kna Mary Ellen Butler to the defendant's
attorney, Quinn D. Hunsaker at Molgard & Hunsaker, P. 0. Box 461,
Brigham City, Utah 84301.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES GROUP INSURANCE

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD
230 South 500 East. Suite 260
Salt Lake City. UT 84102
(801)363-2002

EXHIBIT

"A"

BERTD. HUNSAKER
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

July 21, 1989
Marlon S. Cutler
607 South Tremont
Tremonton, UT 84337
Dear Insured:
In checking our life insurance records, it has been determined that you
do not have an enrollment card in file for the Gem Life Insurance. It
is essential that a current enrollment card with your beneficiary is in
our office for you.
Payroll records show you have the basic $18,000 provided by the'State,
additional term in the amount of $25,000 for a total of $43,000
You do
do not X
have dependent coverage.
Return the completed card to the above address no later than 8/4/89
REMEMBER IT IS ESSENTIAL YOU COMPLETE THIS CARD AS ALL STATE EMPLOYEES
HAVE LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS. Be sure to mark all information.
Thank you for your cooperation,

Kathleen Anderson
Life and Accident Benefits Manager
Note: If possible please obtain a new card from your payroll clerk.

THOMAS L. WILLMORE'S NOTES

7/7/Zf
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EXHIBIT * C *

IN THE F T R S T
ROY ELDER

y

m ?
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HITLER.

DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
(SOLE CUSTODY)

C i v i l NO.

vs.

MARLON CUTLER

IASE

AWARD CALCULATION

Mother

Father

i Combin*

/////////// ///////////I

"inter the number of children of this mother ana
///////////
father for whom support is to be awarded.
IT fnler t^e father-s and mother's gross monthly income. .1875Refer to ^ ^ t i o n s fo- i-lnlhlon of income.
| ^ ~ - p 1 ^ o - u 7 l y ordered alimony that is actuaixy
2b.
ITll
! D O ~+ « n f r alimony ordered for this case). .
•;;rier previously ordered child support. (Do not enter

T.

.1670

Mill///
Mil III/
Mllllll
Ml IIIII
Mllllll
\l11 III I
"MlI, III
Mllllll
Mllllll

rSTSSdlfication and paternity actions only Enter
Ithe amount from Line 12 of the Present radii
_0
0
worksheet for the non-custodial parent.
j_
fCbtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is tne ,,
1 5545
1670
1875
j
u s t e d Monthly
u ^ h l y Gross
Gross for
fc- c
- n"n "
support purposes
;
Adjusted
a
Buppon.
K.m.
^"~~.
...
///////////IS
H
- Rrl r ,s
i., x,
<„ M n o 3 and the number
Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of \l 111II11111 I III
IIIIIll\ 375
4.
children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the
!/////////// l l l l l l l l f l l
Mlllll,
Base Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here.
\l 1111111111
Will
III
Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3|
47
53
M/llfl
by the COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3.
|
Ml fill
Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain i$
199
223.
Mill II
each parent's share of the BaBe Support Obligation. |
Mlllll
7~. Enter the child(ren)'s portion of monthly medical and|dental insurance premiums paid to insurance company. '
!'• ~
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',9. BASE AMOUNT PER CHILD
!
Divide Line 8 by Line
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